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This thesis aims to provide some insights as to how oil prices and oil flows 
might vary with the carrying capacity of the tanker fleet as affected by political 
events. It provides an econometric analysis of tanker freight rates in the modern era 
and proposes a mathematical (quadratic) programming economic model that links 
the crude oil market to the supply elasticity of the world oil tanker fleet based on 
a competitive economy. The economic model can be considered as a version of the 
W alras-Cassel general-equilibrium system which possesses an economically 
meaningful equilibrium solution in terms of oil prices, freight rates and the pattern 
of oil distribution. The implementation of the model is completed using the General 
Algebraic Modeling System (GAMS). The study concludes with a scenario study 
showing how the model could be used to examine the importance of South East 
Asia's sealanes in world seaborne oil trade. The model shows the economic 
vulnerability of oil importing nations, especially Japan, the United States, and 
Western Europe, to a possible closure of South East Asian sealanes. 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
In view of the continuous discoveries of new oil fields as well as upward 
revisions of the world's proven reserves, it seems clear that oil will continue to be the 
major energy source for the foreseeable future. The development of the giant oil-
tankers has resulted in a highly inflexible system dependent on narrowly specified sea 
lanes between relatively few given ports. The vulnerability of seaborne oil is 
amplified by the length of shipping routes and more effective weapon systems. This 
thesis aims to provide some insights as to how oil prices and oil flows might vary with 
the canying capacity of the tanker fleet as affected by political events. It provides an 
econometric analysis of tanker freight rates in the modem era and proposes a 
mathematical (quadratic) programming economic model that links the crude oil 
market to the supply elasticity of the world oil tanker fleet based on a competitive 
economy. 
The results of the traditional static economic analysis suggests that the Suez 
Canal has lost its profound influence on freight rates since its reopening in 1975. This 
is due to the development of supertankers such as the VLCCs and ULCCs, resulting 
in a highly competitive Cape of Good Hope route. It is also shown that freight rates 
are closely linked to tanker activities such as lay-up, delivery and utilization as one 
would expect. 
IX 
The second part of the study examines the issue using a dynamic approach 
based on the classic economic equilibrium theory and nonlinear programming. The 
dynamic model of seaborne oil trade provides analysts with a way to factor in the 
price-sensitive demand and supply of oil and tankers which would not be possible 
with the traditional static statistical approach. The model was implemented using the 
General Algebraic Modeling System (GAMS) and used to examine the importance 
of South East Asia's sealanes in the global seaborne oil trade. The results suggest that 
major oil importing nations such as Japan, the United States and Western European 
nations, as well as the biggest oil supplier of Japan, the Middle East, should not 
underrate the importance of these sealanes. In situations where the shipping supply 
is highly inelastic, which is often the case in the short-run, the closure of South East 
Asia's sealanes would place an enormous pressure on the world's fleets and cause 
tanker freight rates to soar. These sealanes are more than virtual lifelines to South 
East Asian nations and Japan; many other nations, both oil importers and oil 
exporters, would also fmd themselves subsidizing the high freight rates should the 
incident arise. The development of supertankers has relieved the dependence of the 
West on the Suez Canal but it has also created a highly inflexible and vulnerable 
shipping system. For those nations whose economies depend on oceanborne supply 
lanes, it is imperative to secure and protect South East Asia's sealanes. 
X 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Henri Berenger, French diplomat 1921, said "He who owns the oil will own the world, for 
he will rule the sea by means of the heavy oils, the air by means of the ultra-refined oils, and the 
land by means of gasoline and the illuminating oils." (Goralski and Freeburg[1987]). In view of 
the continuous discoveries of new oil fields as well as upward revisions of the world's proven 
reserves, it seems clear that oil will continue to be the major energy source for the foreseeable 
future. The aim of this study is to provide some insights to how oil prices and oil flows might vary 
with the variation in the carrying capacity of the tanker fleet as affected by political events. 
A. BACKGROUND 
Most of the major oil-consuming nations depend on imported supplies, which necessitates 
large-scale seaborne movements of oil. To maintain a steady, increasing flow of oil at lowest 
possible transportation costs, larger ships and ports have been developed in Free World nations. 
One modem mammoth tanker carries more oil than an entire convoy during the last world war. 
The development of the giant oil-tankers has also resulted in a highly inflexible system dependent 
on narrowly specified sea lanes between relatively few given ports, making seaborne oil 
considerably more vulnerable to shipping warfare today than during World War II. Simply the 
announcement that a particular route has been mined, might be enough to disrupt shipping 
patterns or at least cause costly delays during sweeping operations. The vulnerability is further 
amplified by the effectiveness of modem weapon efficiency. Today, one well-aimed torpedo at 
one target will have a greater effect than anything achieved in the 1940s. More simply stated: the 
mere availability of a weapon system, as opposed to its actual use, could be sufficient to disrupt 
shipping patterns. 
Any disruption to the shipping patterns can be represented by a change in the carrying 
capacity ofthe tanker fleet. For examples, the Suez crisis in 1956 caused oil tankers trading to 
Europe to divert round the Cape; the Yom Kippur War in 1973 and the OPEC production cut 
back resulted in the collapse of the tanker market. Both events triggered a sudden change in 
1 
tanker demand in tonnages or tonnage-miles terms. This study examines the relationships among 
oil prices, oil distribution patterns, freight rates and the carrying capacity of the tanker fleet as 
affected by potential political events. 
B. OUTLINE 
Chapter II provides an econometric analysis on the tanker freight rates in the modem era -
-- the period which marks the end of an unprecedented growth of seaborne oil trade from 1974 to 
the late 1980's. The effects of freight rates cannot be underrated in the seaborne oil trade, 
especially so when the transportation cost forms a significant portion of the overall import cost. 
For any quantity of seaborne oil trade between two countries to occur, the price appreciation 
(difference in the market price and supply price) must not fall short of the unit shipping cost (a 
function of tanker freight rate and distance) from the exporting country to the importing. 
Chapter III presents a mathematical (quadratic programming) economic model that links 
the crude oil market to the supply-elasticity of the world oil tanker fleet based on a competitive 
economy. The model would allow one to examine the possible effects of tanker supply elasticity 
on the seaborne oil trade in both short-run (a period too short for significant changes to occur in 
overall shipping capacity through newbuilding, i.e., the supply would be inelastic) and long-run 
(relatively more elastic supply) scenarios. It can also be viewed as a version of the Walras-Cassel 
general-equilibrium system which will be shown in Chapter III, possesses an economically 
meaningful equilibrium solution in terms of oil prices, the pattern of oil distribution, freight rates 
and tanker supply. The implementation of the model is completed using the General Algebraic 
Modeling System (GAMS). 
Chapter IV discusses a scenario study using the model. The scenario study examines the 
importance of sealanes in South East Asia to the world seaborne oil trade. Finally, conclusions 
and possible ideas for future research are presented in Chapter V. 
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II. ECONOMIC CHARACTERISTICS OF MODERN FREIGHT RATES 
Stopford[l988] characterizes the period from 1974 to 1986 as a period of shipping 
depression with very poor financial returns. In the tanker market, the 1973 Yom Kippur War 
ushered in a decade of depression relieved only by a brief market improvement in 1979. By 1985, 
the tonnage of crude oil shipping by sea had fallen from 1973's high of 1,640 million metric tons 
to 1, 159 million metric tons. Despite the decline in demand, the world tanker fleet continued its 
unprecedented growth till the early 1980s, widening the supply/demand gap even further. This 
chapter examines the behavior of freight rates in the modem era, starting in 197 4 as defined by 
Stopford [1988], by means of econometric analysis. Due to the difficulty in obtaining all relevent 
data, this study would only examining the period till 1987. I have assumed a linear relationship (to 
be validated in the study) between freight rates and the independent variables. 
Section A presents the proposed statistical model and definitions of variables used in the 
model. Results of various statistical tests and final analyses are shown in Section B and Section C, 
respectively. 
A. STATISTICAL MODEL 
The analysis depicts the yearly averaged freight rate (Y, in worldscale ---a freight index 
designed to express tanker rates, irrespective of vessel size and route, in terms of the costing of a 
standard vessel) as a function of seven independent variables (X' s): 
xl =years (1974 .. 1987) 
x2 = tanker potential productivity 
=tanker demand in ton-miles (Fearnleys, 1988) I active tanker fleet in dwt (OCED, 1988) 
x3 = average haul in miles 
=tanker demand in ton-miles (Fearnleys, 1988) I tanker demand in tons (Jacobs, 1988) 
x4 =active tanker flee~ in tons (Jacobs, 1988) 
X5 ~ percentage of tanker fleet laid up 
=tanker laid up in tons (Jacobs, 1988) I total tanker fleet (Fearnleys, 1988) 
X6 =oil prices in 1993 dollars (US Department ofEnergy, 1995) 
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X7 =percentage of oil shipped via the Suez Canal (closed in 1974, reopened in Jun'75) 
=tanker traffic via Suez in tons (OECD, 1988) I X4 
.B. STATISTICAL TESTS AND INTERPRETATION 
1. Regression Equations 
The regression equation giving the best fit is <standard error> [p-value] {variance inflation 
factor, Equation (2.4)}: 
Y 28578- 14.33 X1 + 48.84 X2 - o.084 X3 + o.585 X4 - 2.985 X5 - 1.122 X6 + 6.691 X7 
<6.956> <6542> <3.2920> <17.050> <0.0143> <0.1520> <0.8495> <0.4329> <5.0170> 
[0.000] [0.005] [0.005] [0.029] [0.001] [0.008] [0.013] [0.041] [0.231] 
R2 (adjusted)= 0.939 (2.1) 
Excluding X7, the regression equation giving the best fit is: 
Y 21807- 10.90 X1 + 48.35 X2 - o.082 X3 + 0.497 X4 - 2.113 X5 - 0.939 X6 
<7.333> <4349> <2.1660> <17.960> <0.0149> <0.1444> <0.5722> <0.4328> 
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.031] [0.000] [0.011] [0.008] [0.067] 
R2 (adjusted)= 0.932 (2.2) 
Excluding X6, the regression equation giving the best fit is: 
Y 16982-8.531 X1 + 75.50 X2 - o.078 X3 + 0.430 X4 - 1.786 X5 + 2.564 X7 
<9.377) <4349> <2.1660> <17.960> <0.0149> <0.1444> <0.5722> <0.4328> 
[0.001] [0.033] [0.034] [0.004] [0.005] [0.056] [0.105] [0.701] 
R2 (adjusted)= 0.889 (2.3) 
Excluding X6 and X7, the regression equation giving the best fit is: 
Y 14903- 7.472 X1 + 73.42 X2 - o.077 X3 + 0.404 X4 - 1.498 X5 
<8.871> <3587> <1.7930> <16.650> <0.0179> <0.1668> <0.6015> 
[0.000] [0.003] [0.003] [0.002] [0.003] [0.042] [0.037] 
{9.3} { 16.9} {37.0} {7.7} { 1.7} 
R2 (adjusted)= 0.901 (2.4) 
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2. Significance Tests 
At a critical level of 5% (two tails), the results suggest the following relationships (analysis 
in Section C) between the indpendent variables and the freight rate: 
Year (X1) versus Freight Rate 
Productivity (X2) versus Freight Rate 
Average Haul (X3) versus Freight Rate 
Active Fleet (X4) versus Freight Rate 
Laid Up (X5) versus Freight Rate 
Oil Price (~) versus Freight Rate 











No Significant Relationship 
(negative at a critical level of 7%) 
No Significant Relationship 
140 
Y =-t4E-06 +1X 




Figure 2.1 gives the regression plot ofEquation (2_4)_ The only outlier (which 
corresponds to the 1974 data) does not seem to have any strong influences on the regression 
(fortunately) as it very much follows the trend. The results show that X6 and X7 have no 
significant effect on the freight rates. It is not surprising to find some instability in the initial 
equation (Equation (2.1), as well as Equation (2.3)) in view of the high intercorrelation that exists 
between X7 and the other independent variables. This is shown in Table 2.1. 
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xl x2 x3 x4 Xs x6 x7 y 
xl 1.000 * * * * * * -0.725 
x2 -0.848 1.000 * * * * * 0.819 
x3 -0.938 0.874 1.000 * * * * 0.647 
x4 -0.569 0.307 0.682 1.000 * * * 0.258 
Xs 0.321 -0.421 -0.411 -0.409 1.000 * * -0.605 
x6 -0.098 -0.350 0.027 0.552 -0.135 1.000 * -0.205 
x7 0.940 -0.852 -0.940 -0.657 0.572 -0.101 1.000 -0.779 
Table 2.1 Correlations (Pearson) 
The results also show the effect of precision reduction in model due to the inclusion of an 
irrelevant variable. Note that, with X6 excluded, the standard errors associated with the 
coefficients of the regression equation with X7 (Equation (2.3)) are significantly higher when 
compared to that of the equation with X7 omitted (Equation(2.4)). This is expected because X7 is 
highly correlated with other variables, and incorrectly including it in the regression would 
inevitably inflate the standard errors of the others. The effect of including X6 in the regression is 
not as apparent since it is not highly correlated with other variables. 
3. Multicollinearity Checks 
To check whether the high R2 (=0.9, adjusted) in the final regression could have been 
inflated by the high intercorrelations between X~> X2 and X3, I looked for the symptoms of 
multicollinearity listed by Greene[1993]. Removing more than one observation to test the stability 
of the model might not be feasible here as there are fewer than 15 observations available for this 
study. With just the 1987 data omitted, the parameter estimates were found to be stable and no 
wide swings in their values were noted. The coefficients have low standard errors, high 
significance levels exceeding 95%, sensible signs (which will be elaborated in a subsequent 
section) and magnitude. Moreover, the square root of the maximum variance inflation factor 
(Equation(2.4)) is well below 20 suggesting that the collinearity, if any, is not significant. Berk 
[1977] shows that the condition number must be at least as large as the square root of the 
maximum variance inflation factor, so this latter statistic could be used in place of the condition 
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number without much loss of information. 
4. Normality Test 
Visual inspection does not reveal any significant abnormality in the residuals and the result 
of an Anderson-Darling normality test confirms (see Figure 2.2) that the residuals are indeed very 
random or normally distributed at a critical level of 95%. 











std Oev: 6.95925 
N a data: 14 
-10 





.Mdernoo-Oa~ing Ncxmality Test 
A-SQ.Jared: 0.139 
p-value: 0. 966 
Figure 2.3 displays the scatter plots of residuals versus the fits and the five independent 
variables. Again, no clear patterns are observed (some are ambiguous). To check for possible 
heteroscedasticity, Breusch-Pagan/Godfrey [1979] tests were conducted (there are insufficient 
data to conduct the White test [1980] nor the Goldfeld-Quandt test [1965]). The summarized 
outcomes are as follows: 
e with all independent variables included: LM (or ExpSS/2) = 4.85, reject the null 
hypothesis and the model is heteroscedastic. 
e with X4 removed from "Z": LM (or ExpSS/2) = 0.30, do not reject the null hypothesis 
that the model is homoscedastic. 
The results suggest that X4 is probably the key source of heteroscedasticity associated 
with the model. Closer examination of the scatter plot of residuals versus X4 (Figure 2.3d) reveals 
a decreasing trend in the variance with the exception of two outliers which correspond to X4 = 
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290. The two relatively large outliers have also denied any possible use of a stabilizing 
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Figure 2_3 
transformation to "normalize" the effect of X4 (I tried a few typical transformations on X4, but 
these failed). Therefore, the estimated variance ofthe ordinary least squares (OLS) estimator 
would be biased. White [1980] has shown that it is still possible to obtain an appropriate estimator 
for the variance of the least square estimator, even if the heteroscedasticity is related to the 
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independent variables. Using the White estimator for the variance matrix of the least squares 
estimators produces the results below shown in Table 2.2. 
Constant xl x2 x3 x4 Xs 
Coefficient 14903 -7.472 73.42 -0.077 0.404 -1.498 
OLS Std Error 3587 1.7930 16.650 0.0179 0.1668 0.6015 
White Std Error 1723 0.8624 16.867 0.0164 0.1856 0.4379 
Table 2.2 Estimated variances using OLS and White estimator. 
Except for X2 and X4, the corrected standard errors are smaller than the conventional computed 
values, and all slope coefficients remain statistically significant at the critical level of 95% after the 
correction. Therefore, the detected heteroscedasticity does not have negative implications in this 
case and the initial assessments using OLS, Equation(2.4), are validated with smaller standard 
errors. 
6. Autocorrelation Tests 
To check for possible autocorrelation, an AR(1) test was conducted and the Durbin-
Waston statistic was found to be 2.24. At a critical level of95%, the statistic falls in the 
inconclusive region between 0.505 and 2.296. Therefore, nothing could be said about the 
hypothesis testing. An alternative test suggested by Ljung and Box [1979] allows also the tests of 
autocorrelation at different lags. Applying the test for lag 1, 2 and 3, see results in Table 2.3. The 
Ljung and Box statistics suggest that there is no significant autocorrelation in the data. 
Lag Ljung and Box Q Statistic p-value 
1 0.59 0.44 
2 3.08 0.21 
3 5.30 0.15 
Table 2.3 Ljung and Box Q Statistic 
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C. ANALYSIS 
These results are consistent with what we expected on purely theoretical considerations. 
Since the 1956 crisis, the dependence of the West on the Suez Canal has declined significantly. By 
employing VLCCs, the Cape of Good Hope route was highly competitive with the Suez Canal 
and the closing of the Suez Canal in 1967 did not disrupt oil supplies as severely as in 1956. On 
the assumption that the canal might be closed permanently or that its use might be tied to political 
considerations and objectives, many shipowners have ignored the canal as a potential route. By 
1987, the percentage of oil shipped via the Suez Canal had decreased from the 1960s high of 19% 
to about 6% and so had the dependence of freight rates on the Suez Canal (X7). During the period 
from 1974 to 1987, there was no shortage of tanker supply and to the contrary, a significant 
oversupply was noted during the period. It is therefore not surprising that to find that oil prices 
(X6) and freight rates are very weakly negatively correlated due to the high price-elasticity of 
tanker supply during the period and the "willingness" of shipowners to subsidize a portion of any 
increase in oil prices to sustain the overall shipping demand. 
The "years" (X1) reflect the technological developments such as the increased efficiency 
in port services, higher ship speeds and more rapid repairs. Such developments have the effect of 
turning-around tankers faster and generating more shipping capacity in terms of ton-miles per 
dwt. The increased efficiency in shipping will lower the shipping cost, thus lowering the freight 
rate. The productivity or utilization rates (X2) are correctly positively related with freight rates. 
The relationship indicates that high utilization rates or high levels of competition often lead to 
high freight rates and vice versa as expected. The average haul (X3) or the average distance in 
which a unit of oil is shipped is found to be negatively related with the freight rates. This shows 
the effect of the employment of larger tankers such as the VLCCs and ULCCs over the years. 
Size reflects the economies of scale and also the increase in shipping distances as larger tankers 
cannot take advantage of many short routes which make use of narrow straits and canals. A 
positive relationship is also noted between the active tanker fleet (X4) and freight rates which 
indicates that when new tankers due for delivery are being speeded up and maintenance of tankers 
delayed, the prospect of having high freight rates is good. Similarly, in situations where 
shipowners choose to wait out periods of uncertainty by stretching out necessary repairs, the 
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freight rates are expected to remain low. The empirical evidence also suggests that more tankers 
would be laid up or scrapped (X5) during the low freight-rate periods and thus, the negative 
relationships as anticipated. 
The study has illustrated the difficulties in dealing with real data. Such data often contains 
high intercorrelations and some forms of nonlinearity, making the variable selection process 
difficult. The results have provided also valuable insights to the understanding of the market 
forces that determine annual averaged tanker freight rates and quantitative relationships that can 
be used to shape management policy in the areas of tankship operations. However, one must 
recognize that such a stastistical model is static. In this particular case, the period examined 
represents an era of tanker oversupply and low freight rates and the results will not be good for 
predicting or estimating responses when the supply of tankers is very close to the demand, i.e., 
when the tanker productivity is very high. Stopford [1988] provides an excellent discussion on 
how a small increase in demand can treble the freight rate when the supply of tankers is low. The 
next chapter proposes a mathematical model based on the classic economic equilibrium theory 
that would allow one to examine the elasticity effects of the shipping supply on freight rates, oil 
prices and its distribution pattern. 
11 
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ill. SEABORNE OIL TRADE ECONOMIC MODEL 
This chapter shows how the classic economic equilibrium theory can be used to model the 
seaborne oil trade. It begins with a short review on the classic Walras-Cassel economic 
equilibrium system and shows how such system can be transformed to a generalized 
transportation problem. The incorporation of a set of price-sensitive supply and demand functions 
to this transportation problem results in a simple seaborne oil trade model that would allow one to 
investigate the effects of tanker (transport) supply elasticity on the oil trade. The model 
complements the static model presented in the previous chapter, providing a means for analysts to 
examine the dynamic supply and demand aspects of seaborne oil trade. 
A. CLASSIC ECONOMIC EQUILffiRIUM THEORY 
The neoclassical economic equilibrium system was originally expounded by Walras 
(Dorfinan, Samuelson and Solow [1958]). Consider an economy with n commodities and m 
resources. Let si be the amount of the ith resource or factor supplied and let bj be the amount of 
the jth commodity produced. Technical production possibilities are characterized by mn fixed 
numbers Cljj, with each input coefficient representing the physical amount of the ith resource used 
up in the manufacture of a unit of the jth commodity. To obtain the supply for each resource or 
factor from its demand, we get m equations: 
allbl + al2b2 + .................... + alnbn = sl 
~lbl + ~2b2 + .................... + ~nbn = s2 
8mlbl + 8m2b2 + .................... + 8mnbn = sm (3.1) 
Let pj = ~(bh .... , bJ (or the jth demand function) be the price of the jth commodity and let 
qi = ~(sh .... , s,J (or the ith supply function) be the price or rent ofthe service ofthe ith resource 
or factor. All that is needed now to round out the classic Walras-Cassel system is to equate the 
price of each commodity to its unit costs, we get another n equations: 
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anq1 + a2lq2 + .................... + ~1Clrn = P1 
al2ql + ~2q2 + · · · · · .. · · . · · · · · · · · · · + ~Clrn = P2 
alnql + ~nq2 + · · · · · ............ · . · + ~Clrn = Po (3 .2) 
Each household's demands and supplies are subject to a budget constraint which says that 
outlays on goods equals income from resource services. Since this is true for each household 
separately, it is true for the aggregate. Hence they must satisfY an identity or the Walras' law, 
.Ejpjbj =LiCJisi (value of output = total income). 
Dorfinan, Samuelson and Solow [1958] show that ifm > n, the Walras-Cassel system as 
written in Equations (3 .1) and (3 .2), will, in general, have no equilibrium solution. Suppose there 
is only one commodity, a unit ofwhich is produced by 1 unit oflabor and 1 unit ofland. If the 
avaiable supplies are 2 labor and 1 land, how can Equations (3 .1) be satisfied and all of both 
resources used? Taking Equations (3 .1) literally, they require that the demand for each resource 
should just equal the given constant supply. In effect, the solution of the equations would be 
something like the intersection of a derived demand curve with a perfectly inelastic supply curve. 
Although it is not possible for a set of outputs to use up more of a resource than is available, it is 
possible that some amount of a particular resource could be left unused or "free". Zeuthen and 
Neisser pointed out that the market determines which goods shall be free and which scarce 
(Dorfinan, Samuelson and Solow [1958]). Equations (3.1) have to be modified to read 
all bl + al2b2 + . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . + alnbn ::; sl 
~lbl + ~2b2 + .................... + ~nbn::; s2 
~lbl + ~b2 + .................... + ~bn::; sm (3.1a) 
with further condition that if the strict inequality holds in any line of (3. 1 a), i.e., if any resource --
say the kth --is less than fully employed, then its price~ must be zero. 
As for the price-equals-unit-cost equations (3.2), there is nothing wrong for the unit cost 
to exceed price. It is exactly what one would expect of commodities not being produced -- that 
price should not cover unit costs at any positive output. Replace then equations (3.2) by n 
inequalities: 
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auqi + ~Iq2 + ....... · · · · · · · · · . · .. +~I~ z P1 
al2ql + ~2q2 + · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · . · + ~2qm z P2 
(3.2a) 
with the provision that if inequality holds in one or more lines of(3.2a), the corresponding output 
b must be zero. 
The first rigorous study of the Walras-Cassel equilibrium conditions was made by 
Wald[ 1951]. He proved that the existence and uniqueness of solution to the system. Dorfinan, 
Samuelson and Solow[1958] provides a relatively transparent proof, which uses as tools the 
duality theorem oflinear programming and the fixed-point theorem ofKakutani. The problem in 
its dual linear-programming forms, as presented by Dorfman, Samuelson and Solow[1958], is 
(Primal) Maximize Ejpjbj (=value of output) subject to (3.1a) and biz 0. 
(Dual) Minimize Eisi~ (=total income) subject to (3.2a) and Cli z 0. 
Instead of separately maximizing Ejpjbj and minimizing Eisi'li, we can maximize the 
difference between them or the total profit, Ejpjbj - Eisi'li· Duality theory tells us that the 
maximum value oftoal profits achieved at a competitive equilibrium is zero. Elsewhere it is 
negative. It does not matter whether we think of profits being maximized in the aggregate or by 
individual competitive firms, all facing the same prices. Thus, the competitive equilibrium 
examined with total ouput and total income is identical with competitive equilibrium defined in 
terms of profit maximization. Therefore, the following problem possesses also a unique solution 
and the input-output pattern is efficient: 
Maximize Ejpjbj -LiCLSi 
subject to (3.1a): 
aubl + al2b2 + .................... + alnbn ~ sl 
~lbl + ~2b2 + ·-· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · + ~nbn ~ S2 
~1 bl + ~b2 + .................... + ~bn ~ sm 
and the equilibrium factor prices will satisfy the dual inequalities (3.2a): 
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auqt + a2lq2 + ..... · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · + ~tqm ~ Pt 
al2qt + azzqz + ........ · · .......... + ~Qru ~ Pz 
atnqt + aznqz + · · · . · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · + ~Qru ~ Pn 
B. GENERAL TRANSPORTATION PROBLEM 
Some modifications would be needed before the formulation can be applied to model the 
oil and oil-tankers system. In reality, there is often a transportation cost cij involved in shipping a 
unit of ith resource to the site when the jth commodity is produced. Letting Xu = ~jbj = the 
amount of ith resource shipped to produce jth commoditiy, we can tranform the equilibrium 
system to a generalized transportation model involving "price-sensitive" (i.e., price dependent) 
supply and demand functions (the interpretation of these price-sensitive functions, ~( SJ and ~(b), 
is represented in the next section). Conditions (3.1a) would become LP'ij :o; si (Vi) and "equating" 
shipments to demand at each demand destination j gives LiXjj ~ bj (V j) or "shipments must not 
fall short of demand". The net profit would then need to be further reduced by the total shipping 
costs Lipij Xjj and thus, the following transportation model results: 
Maximize Lj~(b) - Li~( SJ - Lijcij Xu 
subject to : 
Lj:XU :o; Sj 
LiXjj ~ bj 
Vi 
Vj 
:xu, si, bj ~ 0 'II i, j 
(We will defer the discussion on equilibrium factor prices, the duals, at this point.) 
(3.3) 
(3.4) 
As we shall see, the mathematical programming model to be used involves nonlinear 
programming rather than just linear programming. Equations (3 .3) state that at each supply origin, 
the shipments from the origin could not exceed its local supply. Similarly, equations (3.4) state 
that at each demand destination, the shipments must suffice to cover the local demand. They are 
equivalent to the conditions of type (3.1a) or "demand :o; supply". There will also be 
complementary conditions oftype (3.2a) or "(price) x (supply-demand)= 0" typing the imputed 
price (the dual variable at the origin/demand destination) to the gap between the supply/demand 
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and total shipments. In the case where total demand is less than total supply, the market price of 
the commodity must be zero, and the commodity is a "free good", as pointed out by Zeuthen and 
Neisser (Dorfinan, Samuelson and Solow [1958]). 
C. CONSTANTFREIGHTRATEMODEL 
To better relate the model to the oil issue, I have redefined the notation: 
i =oil exporting regions, e.g., Middle East, i = 1, .. ,m. 
j =oil importing regions, e.g., Japan, j = 1, .. ,n. 
si = oil supply in region i. 
bj = oil demand in region j. 
Xjj = the quantity of oil to be shipped from region i to region j. 
Yi + oisi =supply price (marginal cost) of oil at region i, where Yi, oi are constants. 
aj - Pjbj = market price of oil in region j, where aj, pj are constants. 
dij =shipping distance between region i and regionj. 
f = marginal freight rate (marginal cost of shipping a unit of oil over one nautical mile). 
cij = unit cost of shipping the oil from region i to region j = f dij. 
The supply price of oil at region i is defined as the lowest price that the ith oil exporter 
requires in order to be willing to supply the quantity si of oil. In equations (3 .1 ), the system 
assumed that the supply function was perfectly inelastic or vertical. To allow for the possibility 
that the exporter may be willing to respond to a higher price by supplying an increased quantity, 
the supply price can be expressed as Yi + oisi with oi (> 0) (Thompson and Thore[1992], see 
Figure 3.1) reflecting the elasticity of supply at ith region. As the equilibrium solution will not 
permit the presence of any positive profits (beyond the payments to all productive factors), the 
supply price is therefore the same as the marginal cost of production. Therefore, the total costs of 
producing si unit of oil can be obtained by integrating the production marginal cost curve y i + 
oisi: 
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Supply pdce curve. 
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Figure 3.1 A typical supply price curve. 
As for the case of the price-sensitive demand, the demand price in region j is defined as the 
highest price that the jth importer would be willing to pay to buy quantity bj of oil. It can also be 
expressed as cxj- Pjbj with pj (> 0) reflecting the elasticity of demand at regionj. Similarly, the 
total demand at region j is given by: 
f(b-) = f a. - A.b. db- = cx-b- -Y:zA.b.2 + integration constant J J J 1-'J J J J J 1-'J J 
The objective function now becomes :Ej(cxjbj- YzPjb/) -:Ei(yisi + Y:zoisi2 )- :EufdijXj_j 
(constants ignored) and is known as an economic potential function. Note that the function is 
concave (it is a sum of linear functions and negative or inverted quadratic functions) and it has a 
maximum at the desired point solution. It has no direct economic interpretation and is used as a 
mathematical artifact only. The entire nonlinear program now reads: 
Maximize :Ej( cxjbj - Y:zpjbj 2) - :Ely isi + Yzois/ ) - :EufdijXj_j 
subject to: 
:Ej~j:::;; si 
:EiXu ~ bj 
~j' si, bj ~ 0 
\ii 
\ij 
\i i, j 
(3.3) 
(3.4) 
The objective function is concave, and the constraints are linear, so that the program is 
actually an instance of quadratic programming. It has a unique optimal solution. 
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D. ECONOMIC INTERPRETATION OF THE MODEL 
Let the Lagrange multipliers or the dual variables of the two sets of constraints (3 .3) and 
(3.4) be J.l; and vj, respectively. The multipliers J.l; are nonpositive and the multipliers vj are 
nonnegative. Denoting the optimal solution by an asterisk (*), the multiplier J.l;* may be interpreted 
as the negative of the imputed unit cost of one unit of oil available at the region i. It is the imputed 
equilibrium oil price or fo.b. (free on board) oil price at exporting region i. The multiplier vj* may 
be interpreted as the equilibrium oil price in importing region j or the landed oil price. The Kuhn-
Tucker conditions state: 
11t (LjXu*- st) = 0, Vi 
vj* (L;Xj/- b/) = 0, V j 
* St * 
-11; ~ Yi + U;S; ' 
vj* ~ aj- Pjb/, 
st(Y; + O;st + 11t) = 0, Vi 






In words, conditions (3.5) state ifthe equilibrium fo.b. price 11t of the supply is nonzero, then the 
optimal shipments will exactly equal the supply. But ifthe shipments fall short ofthe available 
supply, J.l;* must have haven to zero. Similarly, conditions (3.6) state that the equilibrium landed 
price vj* can only be positive if the shipments equal total demand. Conditions (3.7) state that the 
price appreciation J.l;* + vj * must not fall short of the shipment cost fdi.i for shipment Xjj * to occur. 
Otherwise, a hypothetical shipper would suffer a unit loss and no shipments would occur. This set 
of conditions is comparable to conditions (3.2a) of the classic economic equilibrium system. 
Conditions (3.8) spell out the association between the equilibrium fo.b. price 11t and the supply 
priceY;+ O;st. Again, 11t must not be less than the supply priceY; + o;st for a positive amount of 
st to be exported. Conditions (3.9) reflect the requirement for the equilibrium landed price v/ to 
be lower than the market price aj - Pjbj • for any purchase bj * to take place. 
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E. PRICE-SENSITIVE TANKER SUPPLY AND FINAL MODEL 
The study has so far assumed an unlimited supply of shipping capacity at a constant freight 
rate f, i.e., LijXjj is not restricted. In real life, the oil-tanker shipping capacity is limited and is 
usually subject to some degree of elasticity because of the opportunity for transfer of shipping 
capacity between services (e.g., oil-tankers in grain trades). Factors such as service speed, off-hire 
and port turnaround also influence the shipping capacity in terms of ton-miles. A related issue is 
how the supply or offering of tanker shipping is related to freight rates. 
There are essentially two types of ratemaking in shipping, namely conference ratemaking 
and tramp ratemaking. Conference ratemaking is provided by associations of shipping companies 
which have come together to form liner conferences. They provide regular services (and 
capacities) on defined routes at agreed and published rates. Frankel[l987] shows that for a 
conference to maximize its profit, it will introduce a value-based tariff which will be higher than 
its average marginal costs for the average cargo carried, and these marginal costs could be used as 
the lower bound for its tariffs. The marginal cost can thus be seen as the lowest price a 
conference requires in order to be willing to supply an additional unit of shipping capacity. Tramp 
shipping (for independently-owned vessels) is generally assumed to be a freely competitive market 
in which prices are determined by supply and demand. As it is not the main player in conference-
dominated markets, one can expect tramp ratemaking be very close or competitive to conference 
ratemaking. In this study, we will use the marginal cost curve as a price function for the tanker 
freight rates. Devanney[1973] developed supply curves in ton-miles (see Figure 3.2) for tankers as 
a function of marginal costs in US$/dwt. These indicate that freight rates are quite important for 
the short-run (a period too short for significant changes in overall shipping capacity through 
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Figure 3.2 Supply curves in ton-miles for tankers as a function of marginal 
costs in US$/dwt. 
After incorporating the price-sensitive tanker-supply, the model would become: 
Maximize 
subject to : 
LjXy:::; si 
:EiXu ~ bj 
LijXjAj:::; t 
Xy, sj, bj, t ~ 0 
Vi 
\ij 




where t represents the quantity of tanker capacity supplied and A., w (> 0) are constants. Like the 
price-sensitive supply functions, ). +wt would be the supply price of the shipping capacity or the 
marginal shipping cost and A.t + 'l2wt2 (= J (A. +wt)dt, with the integration constant suppressed) 
gives the total shipping costs. Note that the concavity of the objective function is not affected by 
the new insertion. 
Let the Lagrange multiplier of constraint (3 .1 0) be 't (:::; 0) and 't * can be interpreted as the 
imputed equilibrium freight rate of the system. The Kuhn-Tucker conditions related to 't are as 
follows: 
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-r*(I:uxu*- t*) = 0 
--r* ~ A +wt*, t*(A +wt* + -r*) = 0, 




Condition (3 .11) states that if the optimum total shipments LuXu * fall short of the available tanker 
supply t*, the equilibrium freight rate-r* must have fallen to zero. If -r* is nonzero in equilibrium, 
then those shipments must equal the tanker supply. Condition (3.12) reinstates the relationship 
between the equilibrium freight rate -r * and the marginal shipping cost A +wt *. The equilibrium 
freight rate can never exceed the the marginal shipping cost or else no shipping capacity would be 
supplied. If a positive quantity of shipping capacity t * is supplied, then the freight rate equals the 
marginal shipping cost. Conditions (3.7a) analogous to those in (3.7) can be interpreted as before 
with the exception that fis now replaced by --r*. 
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IV. SCENARIO STUDY 
This chaper presents the results of a scenario study on the significance of South East 
Asia's sealanes in the global seaborne oil trade. It uses the mathematical model derived in the 
previous chapter to illustrate what might happen in situations where these sealanes are no longer 
available to seaborne trade. The price-sensitive tanker supply function incorporated in the model 
would allow us to investigate both short-run (high supply inelasticity) and long-run (low supply 
inelasticity) effects in this study. 
A. SCENARIO 
To enter the Pacific Ocean from the Indian Ocean, one must either pass south and east of 
Australia or pass through one of the straits in the South East Asia region. The shortest ofthese 
routes is through the Straits ofMalacca. It is also the only passage that is formally in international 
waters; all other passages go through Indonesian territory. Most oil shipments from the Middle 
East and Northern Europe to the major oil-consuming nations in the East Asia region pass 
through these sealanes. The oil shipments transiting this region account for about 15% ofthe 
world seaborne oil trade in terms of tons and about 20% in terms of tonne-miles. The alternate 
passage via Australia would nearly double the sailing distances from the Middle East to countries 
in North East Asia and thus, would very significantly increase the shipping demand in terms of 
tonne-miles. This study will examine how the oil trade and tanker market would react to such an 
extended trip, taking into consideration the supply and demand elasticities of oil in different 
regions. 
This is a hypothetical study with 1982 data; I will not prophesy how such a scenario might 
arise. The year 1982 was characterized by depressed conditions similar to other years in the 
modem era. The international seaborne oil trade was decreasing and a large surplus overhanging 
the world tanker market was the result. The price-elasticities were assumed to be elastic at 0.67 
across all supply regions and a unitary price-elasticity would be used for all oil demands 
(Kennedy, 1978). The average freight rate for 1982 was US$1.15 per barrel per 11,000 nm as 
reported in the Harvard Business School Report (Harvard, 1983). The fo.b. oil prices and inter-
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regional seaborne movements of crude oil were obtained from the U.S. Department of Energy 
(US DoE, 1995) and the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD, 
1983), respectively. 




- (9) oil exporters: 
USA, Canada, Latin America, Western Europe, North Africa, West Africa, 
Middle East, South East Asia and Eastern Europe. 
- (7) oil importers: 
USA, Canada, Western Europe, Africa, South East Asia, Japan, Australia 
and Eastern Europe. 
-price elasticity of supply curve i (=0.67). 
-price elasticity of demand curve j (=1.0). 
- price elasticity of shipping supply curve (to be varied from 10 to 0. 002). 
- curve coefficients of supply curve i where: 
cs2i = 1982 oil price (US DoE, 1995)1oil supplied by region i (OECD, 1983); 
cs1i = 1982 oil price* (1 - 11esi) 
(cs1i derived from the supply equation: oil price= cs1i + cs2/estsupply). 
cb1j, cb2j -curve coefficients of demand curve j where: 
cb2j = 1982 oil price (US DoE, 1995) I oil demand in region i (OECD, 1983); 
cb1j = 1982 oil price* (1 + 1/esJ 
(cb1j derived from the demand equation: oil price= cb1j- cb2/eb/demand). 
ct1, ct2 - curve coefficients of shipping supply curve where: 
ct1 = 1982 freight rate (Harvard, 1983) I shipping supply in 1982 (OECD, 1983); 
ct2 = 1982 freight rate* (1 - 1/esi) 
(ct1 derived from the supply equation: freight rate= ctl + ct21et*supply). 
-shipping distance from exporter ito importer j in nm (Lloyd, 1981). 
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* Variables: 
- amount of oil supplied by exporter i in tons. 
- amount of oil imported by importer i in tons. 
- amount of shipping capacity utilized in ton-miles. 




- [lcsltsi + lhcs2i*s?/esJ 
(ctl *t + lhct2* t2/et) 
subject to the constraints: 
= EP (economic potential) 
Lj~j ~ si 
Li"u 2 bj 
Lij~Aj ~ t 
Si, bj, Xu 2 0 
Vi 
Vj 
The model is essentially the same as that shown in Chapter III with the following 
exceptions: 
cblj = aj, 
csli = Yi, 
cb2/ebj = pj, 
cs2/esi = oj, 
ctl = .1.., ct2 = w. 
(The model in GAMS codes is given in Appendix A.) 
C. APPROACH 
The approach was first to validate the model by comparing the simulated results with the 
actual outcomes in 1982. We then proceed to inject the scenario of"losing" the South East Asian 
sealanes at different shipping supply elasticities ( et, in the model) and note how the equilibrium oil 
prices, distribution pattern and freight rate were affected. The unavailability of the sealanes or 
"crisis" was simulated by adjusting the affected distances between exporters and importers (dij's, 
7in the model). 
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D. RESULTS AND ANALYSIS 
The model was able to produce oil productions and demands close to the actual outcomes 
in 1982 (Appendix B lists both the simulated and actual outcomes). Below are results associated 
with the denial of South East Asian sealanes to world seaborne oil trade. 
1. Freight Rates 
Figure 4. 1 shows how the freight rate in crisis is expected to vary over the range of 
shipping inelasticities defined between 0.1 (very elastic) to 500 (very inelastic). The freight rate 
prior to the disruption was about 0.1 US$ per ton-mile and according to the plot, it is expected to 
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Figure 4.1 Freight Rate versus Shipping Supply 
Elasticity 
Figure 4.1 also suggests that the rate of increase would slow down at some critical 
elasticity and level off at an equilibrium freight rate of about 0.75 US$/ton-mile or seven times the 
pre-disruption rate. This maximum value also serves as an upper bound for the freight rate in 
crisis -- the maximum freight rate one could expect in the absence of any prior knowledge about 
the shipping supply elasticity. Any higher freight rate would result in "unprofitable" oil trade and 
thus, would not happen (based on the set of oil demand and supply functions used in this study). 
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2. Shipping Demands 
The unavailability of Sea East Asian sealanes can be viewed as an overall reduction in the 
transportation efficiency as tankers would now need to sail much longer distances for oil 
deliveries. The inefficiency translates to additional transportation costs and, thus, oil prices 
increase and overall oil consumption decreases. However, lower oil consumption does not 
necessarily lead to lower shipping demand which is often expressed in terms ofladen ton-miles. 
Figure 4.2 shows how the shipping demand (in terms ofladen ton-miles and expressed as a 
percentage increase in shipping demand from the pre-disruption level) would be affected by the 
elasticity of shipping supply in crisis. 
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Figure 4.2 Percentage Increase in Shipping Demand 
versus Elasticity of Shipping Supply. 
As expected, the shipping demands during crisis are generally higher (when compared to 
the pre-disruption level) as the average sailing distance is now higher. The increase in shipping 
demand could be as high as 27% in cases where the shipping supply is elastic. The increase in 
shipping demand falls with the increase in elasticity of shipping supply in crisis (a direct reversal of 
that of freight rates) and approaches zero when the elasticity is very high. High elasticity implies 
that it would be very expensive to step up the shipping supply; it would not be profitable for the 
nations to demand more shipping capacity and the final demand would stay close to the pre-
disruption level. With elastic shipping supply, nations would take advantage of the low freight rate 
to sustain their respective oil consumption at the pre-disruption level. 
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3. Oil Prices and Oil Distribution Patterns 
As mentioned in earlier discussion, the absence of South East Asian sealanes from the 
global seaborne oil trade could be translated to higher transportation costs. The results suggest 
that when the shipping supply is elastic, the equilibrium oil prices would not change much as the 
trade would continue to enjoy a low freight rate and transportation costs remain as a small portion 
of the overall oil prices. However, some changes to the oil distribution pattern are noted. Due to 
the dramatic increase in the sailing distance between Japan and its traditional oil source in the 
Middle East, Japan would now find it attractive to import oil from North America (USA and 
Canada) instead; a significant increase in oil trade between North America and Japan can be 
expected. Despite the increased oil trade between Japan and North America, the Middle East 
would continue to be the major oil source for Japan. It is also noted that the Middle East would 
export more oil to Western Europe and North America as a consequence of the changes in sailing 
distances. Table 4.1 summarizes the changes in oil distribution in situations where the shipping 
supply is elastic. 
However, when the shipping supply is inelastic, the freight rate would soar as shown in 
Figure 4.1 and, coupled with the dramatic increasing in sailing distances between some regions, 
some significant changes in both fo.b and landed oil prices could be expected in these regions. 
Key "losers" in this scenario are the Middle East and Japan where the Middle East can expect its 
oil production to be reduced by about 24% (and a 15% cut to its oil price) and the landed oil price 
in Japan is expected to soar by about 11%. The Middle East is expected to absorb much of the 
increase in transportation cost to Japan (because of the increased sailing distance) in order to 
compete with other exporters. Part of the increase in transportation cost would be absorbed by 
Japan itself and thus, a rise in Japanese oil prices occur. The Western European importers can also 
expect a price rise of about 8% as a result of the reduction in the Middle East's oil production. 
The "big winners" in this case would be Latin America's oil exporters as they could now demand 
higher prices for their oils because of their proximity to Japan. The traditional importers ofLatin 
America's oils, the USA, would be victimized by these changes, seeing its landed oil price soar by 
about 8%. No significant increase in oil trade between Japan and Latin America is noted as a 
result of the increased export from Latin America to the USA and the Middle East exporters' 
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willingness to reduce their prices. Other changes may be considered as relatively insignificant. The 
summary is shown in Table 4.2 and Table 4.3. 
From To Pre-Crisis Flow Post-Crisis Flow 
(in million tons) (in million tons) 
United States Western Europe 
Canada Western Europe 
United States Japan 
Canada Japan 
Western Europe United States 8.50 7.43 
Western Europe Canada 18.13 18.41 
Latin America United States 144.34 140.82 
North Africa Western Europe 82.32 79.67 
West AFrica Western Europe 61.00 58.93 
Middle East United States 
Middle East Western Europe 
Middle East Africa 24.04 24.52 
Middle East Japan 174.33 171.57 
Middle East Australia 10.58 10.78 
Eastern Europe Western Europe 60.40 58.53 
Table 4.1 Changes in oil distribution pattern, elastic tanker supply (elasticity= 0.33). 
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Region % Change in Oil Price % Change in Oil Imported 
United States 8.13 -7.47 
Canada 4.98 -4.53 
Western Europe 6.15 -5.65 
Africa -9.45 8.23 
Japan 11.06 -9.88 
Australia -2.88 2.57 
Table 4.2 Changes in oil importing regions (elasticity= 500). 
Region % Change in Oil Price % Change in Oil Exported 
United States 1.19 1.84 
Canada 1.18 2.70 
Latin America 6.28 8.88 
Western Europe -2.39 -3.71 
Northen Africa 2.80 4.35 
Western AFrica -0.97 -1.55 
Middle East -15.18 -23.86 
Eastern Europe 3.55 5.32 
Table 4.3 Changes in oil exporting regions (elasticity= 500). 
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V. CONCLUSIONS 
In Chapter I, we highlighted the importance and vulnerability of today' s seaborne oil trade 
and explained how disruptions to tanker shipping can be represented. Chapter II analyzed the 
factors that influence freight rates using traditional static economic analysis. The analysis 
suggested that the Suez Canal had lost its profound influence on freight rates since its reopening 
in 197 5. This is due to the development of supertankers such as the VLCCs and ULCCs, resulting 
in a highly competitive Cape of Good Hope route. It was also shown that freight rates are closely 
linked to tanker activities such as lay-up, delivery and utilization as ·one would expect. Chapter III 
was devoted to a theoretical discussion on how the classic economic equilibrium theory and 
nonlinear programming could be used to model a dynamic seaborne oil trade. It provides analysts 
with a way to factor in the price-sensitive demand and supply of oil and tankers which is not 
possible with the traditional static statistical approach. Chapter IV used the dynamic model to 
examine the importance of South East Asia's sealanes in the global seaborne oil trade. The results 
suggested that major oil importing nations such as Japan, the United States and Western 
European nations, as well as the biggest oil supplier of Japan, the Middle East, should not 
underrate the importance of these sealanes. In situations where the shipping supply is highly 
inelastic, which is often the case in the short-run, the closure of South East Asia's sealanes would 
place an enormous pressure on the world's fleets and cause freight rates to soar. These sealanes 
are more than virtual lifelines to South East Asian nations and Japan; many other nations, both oil 
importers and oil exporters, would also find themselves subsidizing the high freight rates should 
the incident arise. The development of supertankers has relieved the dependence ofthe West on 
the Suez Canal, but it has also created a highly inflexible and vulnerable shipping system. For 
those nations whose economies depend on oceanborne supply lanes, it is imperative to secure and 
protect South East Asia's sealanes. 
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APPENDIX A - GAMS PROGRAM 
SETS 
R regions 
/USA, CAN, WEUR,AFRICA,SEA,JAP,AUS,LATIN,NA, W A,ME,EEUR/ 
I(R) oil exporters 
/USA,CAN,LATIN,WEUR,NA, W A,ME,SEA,EEUR/ 
J(R) oil importers 
/USA,CAN,WEUR,AFRICA, SEA,JAP ,AUS/ 
C coefficients 
/C1,C2/; 
TABLE D 1 (I,J) one-way shipping distance between i and j in thousand miles 
USA CAN WEUR AFRICA SEA JAP AUS 
USA 99999 99999 5.600 7.500 6.900 4.600 7.000 
CAN 99999 99999 3.300 8.000 6.500 4.000 10.00 
LATIN 1.000 3.200 4.700 4.700 9.000 8.000 8.000 
WEUR 5.600 3.900 99999 3.000 12.70 14.50 12.50 
NA 4.200 5.000 1.800 1.300 7.500 10.00 9.000 
WA 5.200 5.000 3.80t> 4.600 9.000 10.90 8.500 
ME 12.00 12.60 11.10 2.900 3.800 6.700 6.300 
SEA 7.000 7.900 12.70 4.600 99999 2.600 2.500 
EEUR 5.900 4.200 1.400 3.300 13.00 14.80 12.80 
33 
TABLE D2(I,J) one-way shipping distance between i and j in thousand miles without "SEA " 
USA CAN WEUR AFRICA 
USA 99999 99999 5.600 7.500 
CAN 99999 99999 3.300 8.000 
LATIN 1.000 3.200 4.700 4.700 
WEUR 5.600 3.900 99999 3.000 
NA 4.200 5.000 1.800 1.300 
WA 5.200 5.000 3.800 4.600 
:ME 12.00 12.60 11.10 2.900 
SEA 99999 99999 99999 99999 
EEUR 5.900 4.200 1.400 3.300 
PARAMETER D(I,J); 
D(I,J) = D1(I,J) (comment: or D2(I,J)); 
PARAMETER ES(I) supply elasticity in region i I 











LATIN 0.67, NA 0.67, WA 0.67, ME 0.67, EEUR 0.671; 
PARAMETER EB(J) demand elasticity in region jl 
USA 1, CAN 1, WEUR 1, AFRICA 1, SEA 1, JAP 1, AUS 11; 
PARAMETER tanker supply elasticity ET Ill; 
TABLE CS(C,I) supply curve coefficients of exporter i 
USA CAN WEUR SEA LATIN NA 
C1 -116.9 -117.3 -116.97 -122.9 -98.3 -119.7 












WA ME EEUR 
-123 -118.1 -111.9 
3.38 0.434 3.644 
TABLE CB(C,J) demand curve coefficients of importer j 
USA CAN WEUR AFRICA SEA JAP AUS 
C1 464.41 464.41 464.41 464.41 464.41 464.41 464.41 
C2 -1.346 -13.42 -0.6063 -10.32 -2.947 -1.284 -23.22 
PARAMETER CT(C) tanker supply curve cofficients /C1 0, C2 0.00016/; 
VARIABLES 
S(I) oil supplied by importer i in million tons 
B(J) oil imported by exporter j in million tons 
T tanker capacity supplied in trillion ton-miles 
X(I,J) oil shipped from i to j in million tons 
EP economic potential; 








supply balance equation in region i 
demand balance equation in region j 
tanker supply balance equation; 
-SUM(I,CS(''C1",I)*S(I)+CS("C2",I)*S(I)**2/2/ES(I)) 
+ SUM(J, CB("C 1" ,J)*B(J)+CB("C2" ,J)*B(J)**2/2/EB(J)) 
- SUM(L,CT("C1")*T+CT("C2")*T**2/2/ET) =E= EP; 
BES(I) .. SUM(J,X(I,J)$(D(I,J) < 9999)) =L= S(I); 
BEB(J) .. SUM(I,X(I,J)$(D(I,J) < 9999)) =G= B(J); 
BET .. SUM( (I,J),X(I,J)*D(I,J)) =L= T 
' 
MODEL TANKER /ALL/; 
SOLVE TANKER USING NLP MAXIMIZING EP; 
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APPENDIX B- SIMULATED AND ACTUAL OUTCOMES 
Oil Importing Region Actual Amount Imported Simulated Amount Imported 
(in million tons) (in million tons) 
United States 172.5 179.86 
Canada 17.3 18.13 
Western Europe 383.0 399.34 
Africa 22.5 24.04 
South East Asia 78.8 83.975 
Japan 180.8 191.02 
Australia 10.0 10.58 
Table B 1 Simulated demands in oil importing regions. 
Oil Exporting Region Actual Amount Exported Simulated Amount Exported 
(in million tons) (in million tons) 
United States 11.7 10.54 
Canada 10.4 9.43 
Latin America 121.3 144.34 
Western Europe 29.6 26.63 
South East Asia 52.9 43.71 
Northen Africa 93.0 82.32 
Western Africa 72.7 61.0 
Middle East 544.0 468.57 
Eastern Europe 61.4 60.40 
Table B2 Simulated productions in oil exporting regions. 
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